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Abstract:
Purpose: In order to solve problems in the current project management system, the paper
presents the asymmetric information games existing in construction projects through
information economics viewpoints.
Design/methodology/approach: The owner has private information about the project
profitability and he exerts an unobservable level of  effort in order to increase the feasibility of
successfully completing the project in terms of  meeting product specifications. The paper
analyzes the principal-agent relationship between the owner and supervisor with “principal-
agent theory” of  the game theory. In addition, the paper validates the model through two
project cases.
Findings: We can conclude that the incentive contract plays an important role in reducing the
moral hazard. The main contribution of  this study is to examine the influence of  both pre-
contractual private information and the sensitivities between the interrelated performance
measures on the design of  an optimal incentive contract.
Social implications: At last, some advices are put forward to advance the project management
system in China, and some external mechanism can effectively inhibit the "moral hazard" and
"adverse selection" to occur.
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Originality/value: A model of  principal-agent relationship between the owner and supervisor
is formulated. This model takes consideration of  the moral hazard, which is different from
most existing researches in this field.
Keywords: project supervision, asymmetric information, principal-agent
1. Introduction
The project management system of China’s construction market has experienced a long
process of three systems. The first one is the unitary planned economy system; the second
one is the binary model between owner and contractor; the third one is the currently used
triangle model between owner, contractor and supervisor (Liu, 2007). The introduction of the
project supervision system is designed to form the equilibrium among the construction market
participants. However, there are a series of problems in the actual operation of the project
supervision system, which seriously restrict the formation of the market mode (Huang, Cheng
& Tan, 2003). The development of information economics has given a good explanation for the
above problems. The economics of information, which uses the asymmetrical information game
theory, is an application in economics, and it is also a new development of microeconomics.
The hypothesis of information asymmetry is the foundation of the existence of information
economics. In the construction market, the owner and the contractor are the parties of the
information asymmetry game. The introduction of project supervision system can reduce the
information asymmetry, so that the game is becoming fairer. It is in consonance with the
supervising principles of fairness and justice. In China, the supervision market is still in the
period of development. Therefore it is urgent to use a comprehensive and fair bidding system
in construction market to solve this problem.
2. The Principal–Agent Problem
The principal–agent problem or agency dilemma occurs when one person or entity (the
"agent") is able to make decisions that impact, or on behalf of, another person or entity: the
"principal". The dilemma exists because sometimes the agent is motivated to act in his own
best interests rather than those of the principal. The agent-principal relationship is a useful
analytic tool in political science and economics, but may also apply to other areas.
The problem arises where the two parties have different interests and asymmetric information
(the agent having more information), such that the principal cannot directly ensure that the
agent is always acting in its (the principal's) best interests[2], particularly when activities that
are useful to the principal are costly to the agent, and where elements of what the agent does
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are costly for the principal to observe. Moral hazard and conflict of interest may arise. Indeed,
the principal may be sufficiently concerned at the possibility of being exploited by the agent
that he chooses not to enter into a transaction at all, when that deal would have actually been
in both parties' best interests: a suboptimal outcome that lowers welfare overall. The deviation
from the principal's interest by the agent is called 'agency costs (Hu, 2004).
Various mechanisms may be used to align the interests of the agent with those of the
principal. In employment, employers (principal) may use piece rates/commissions, profit
sharing, efficiency wages, performance measurement (including financial statements), the
agent posting a bond, or the threat of termination of employment.
As a solution to the principal–agent problem, though, tipping is not perfect. In the hopes of
getting a larger tip, a server, for example, may be inclined to give a customer an extra large
glass of wine or a second scoop of ice cream. While these larger servings make the customer
happy and increase the likelihood of the server getting a good tip, they cut into the profit
margin of the restaurant. In addition, a server may dote on generous tippers while ignoring
other customers, and in rare cases harangue bad tippers.
3. The Establishment of the Principal-Agent Model
In the engineering construction, the information asymmetry between the owners and
supervisors often leads to the moral hazard problem, which means the supervision work
performance will be far from the owner’s intended target (Zhu, Zhou & Wu, 2011).
This section will use the "principal-agent theory" to analyze the principal-agent relationship
between the owner and the supervisor in the project supervision system. According to the
different assumptions, there are two different kinds of principal-agent models between the
owner and the supervisor (Qin, 2004). And then, we can get the analysis of the owner and the
supervisor’s choice and behavior.
3.1 The Certain Principal-agent Model of Fixed Compensation
There are three hypotheses, which are the preconditions of this model. 
Hypothesis 1: The principal-agent relationship between the owner and supervisor is
based on a kind of standard contract. The owner only chooses whether it provides the
contract，but the owner can't choose to pay the remuneration or functions paid to the
supervisor.
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Hypothesis 2: The supervisor's work is without uncertainty, which means that the output
of the supervisor is a certain function to the degree of efforts. Therefore, the owner can
master supervisor's working condition according to the results.
Hypothesis 3: The supervisor's behavior choice is discrete, only including hard work and
lazy work.
In this model, firstly, the owner decides whether to receive a trust. Besides, the supervisor
determines whether or not to accept the contract. Finally the supervisor chooses how to work
hard after the contract. This is a three-stage game, which can be described by a game tree.
Figure 1. Principal-agent game tree
Now we analyze the game between them under the assumptions closed to the actual situation.
In this game, the two parties know clearly about the profits about the two sides and they can
observe the choices of the opposite side. Therefore, the game is a complete and perfect
information dynamic game, which can be analyzed by the backward induction.
Firstly, analysis of the supervisor's level of efforts plays an important role in the third stage. If
the supervisor tries to work hard, the owner can get a high output R(H) and he must pay for
the supervisor a high wage v(H); the supervisor gets a high v(H), but he has a high negative
utility (cost) -H. Ultimately, the gains of the owner is R(H) - v(H), and the supervisor's profit is
v(H) - H. If the supervisor chooses not to work hard, so the owner gets a low output R(L); the
supervisor gains a low wage v(L), and has a lower negative utility -L. In the end, the benefit of
the both sides respectively is R(L) - v(H) and v(L) - L. According to the principle of rational
game, if:
R(H) - H > v(L) - L (1)
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At this time, the supervisor will choose to work hard. The inequality (1) is an incentive
compatibility constraint (IC) of the hardworking supervisor. The hardworking supervisor to be
paid can get the basic pay or more than the lazy ones. At the same time, the wage of the
struggling must can compensate for a greater negative effect than the lazy ones. As a
consequence, the supervisor could choose to work hard automatically. If the constraint
conditions cannot be met, the supervisor must choose not to take efforts.
Secondly, it is essential to judge whether the supervisor accepts the commission. For the third
stage the supervisor can choose whether to work hard, corresponding to different benefits. As
the rational game party, in both cases, the conditions for the supervisor choosing to accept the
contract are: v(H) - H > 0 (work hard); v(L) - L > 0 (not work hard).
The two inequalities are the constraint conditions which can decide the supervisor's choice. The
economic meaning is: the supervisor's profit from the contract can't get less than the
maximum of not accepting the contract. This is the basic condition for the supervisor accepting
the commission.                
Finally, the choice of the first stage needs a detailed explanation. R(0) stands for the owner's
profit when the owner doesn't entrust a supervisor. If the supervisor chooses to refuse in the
second stage, the owner's choice is without meaning. If the supervisor chooses to accept the
commission in the second stage, the owner makes the decision according to the supervisor's
choice in the third stage. Only when the supervisor’s benefits are positive, can the owner
choose to entrust.
By summarizing the two game parties' choices, we can get the sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium. This model is a complete process of signing the contract. As rational parties, the
owner must get more profit by the commission. The supervisor demands he should get a
greater benefit than (or at least equal to) the maximum income when not accepting the
contract. While working hard makes greater benefits, the supervisor will naturally choose to
make efforts.
3.2 The Uncertain Principal-Agent Model of Selective Compensation
The above model is under some additional assumptions. The supervisor's work is certain and
observable, which obviously is a simplification of the reality. Now we analyze the game
between them under the assumptions closed to the actual situation.
Hypothesis 1: The supervisor's work is uncertain, which means his output is not only
determined by his own efforts, but also by the outside control of the objective conditions.
Hypothesis 2: The supervisor can choose the reward function, that is, the pay system.
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Hypothesis 3: The supervisor's level of efforts is a continuous variable, assuming e is a
one-dimensional continuous variable.
Hypothesis 4: The owner is risk neutral; however, the supervisor is the type of risk-
averse.
In addition, the supervisor has a positive opportunity cost when he doesn't accept the
commission. Then we analyze the principal-agent model under the above assumptions.
Firstly, assume that the supervisor's output function and the level of effort is linear
relationship:  = e + q. q obeys the normal distribution, where m = 0, Var = s2, standing for the
exogenous uncertain variable. By the formulas: Ep = E (e + q) = e, Var(p) = s2, we can
conclude that the effort of supervisor decides the m, not affecting the Var. Suppose the contract
between the two parties using a linear: s(p) = a + bp, where a is the fixed income of the
supervisor (nothing to do with the p), and b is the project share of the output. b = 0 means
that supervisor doesn't take risk. b = 1 means that the supervisor bears all the risk. Because
the owners are risk neutral, given s(p) = a + bp, the owners' expected utility equals to
expected income:
Ev(p-s(p)) = E(p-a-bp) = - a + E(1-b) p = - a + (1-b) (2)
Assume the utility function of the supervisor is with characteristics of risk-adverse. 
That is m = -erv, where r is the absolute measure of risk aversion, v is the real international
monetary income. Assume the supervisor's cost: c(e) = 
1
2
be2, where b represents the cost
factor. With the same effort, the larger b is assigned, the greater negative is brought. The
supervisor's actual income is:
v = s(p) - c (e) = a + b(e + q) - 1
2
be2 (3)
Because the supervisor is risk-averse, the certainly equivalent income equals to the mean
income minus the random cost of risk. Therefore, uncertainly equivalent income:
Ev - 
1
2
rb2s2 = a + be - 
1
2
rb2s2 - 
1
2
be2 (4)
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Ev is the supervisor’s expected income. 1
2
rb2s2 is the risk costs of the supervisor. When b = 0,
the supervisor's cost of risk is 0, which means the supervisor doesn't take any risks at this
time. The supervisor's largest expected utility function is equivalent to the certainty equivalent
income, that is:
Em = a + be - 1
2
rb2s2 - 1
2
be2 (5)
Where v stands for the supervisor's retained income levels. Therefore, if the supervisor's
certainly equivalent income is less than v, the supervisor will not accept the contract. As a
consequence, the participation constraint of the supervisor is as follows:
Em = a + be - 1
2
rb2s2 - 1
2
be2  v (IR)
On the incentive constraint (IC), we can carry on the analysis of two cases:
• The owners can observe the effort level of the supervisor. Because the owner can
observe the effort level e, then the incentive constraint does not work. Any level of e
can be achieved by meeting the mandatory contract. Therefore, the owner's problem is
how to determine a, b,  e to achieve the maximum benefit.
The mathematical model of optimization is as follows:
max
a ,β,e
Ev=−a+(1−β)e (6)
s.t. a + be - 1
2
rb2s2 - 1
2
be2  v (IR)
In the best case, the equation of IR constraint is true, because the owner does not need
to pay more for the supervisor. We can use the constraints to obtain  by the
deformation of the equation, namely: 
 -a = be - 
1
2
rb2s2 - 
1
2
be2 - v (7)
Take -a into the objective function, getting the most objective optimization function:
max
a ,β ,e
(e−1
2
ρβ2σ2−b
2
e2−ω) (8)
Derivative of the objective function, the optimal first-order conditions were: e* = 1
b
;
b* = 0.
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Take the results into the IR constraint equation (7): 
a✳=ω¯+b
2
(e✳)2=ω¯+ 1
2b
(9)
The economic analysis of the solution: b* = 0, the supervisor does not take any risk,
and the income has nothing to do with the output; a✳=ω+ 1
2b
, that the fixed income
that the owner pays to the supervisor equals to the supervisor's retained income plus
the cost of effort; e✳=1
b
achieving an optimal level, ie 1 = be. When the owner
observes the supervisor's choice of e<1
b
, he will pay for the supervisor av < a*, so the
supervisor will certainly choose e=1
b
.
• The supervisor's effort level e can't be observed. The supervisor will choose to
maximize his certainty equivalent income. After derivation calculus to equation (4), we
can get: e=β
b
. 
At this point the incentive constraint for the supervisor is e=β
b
. When the supervisor
does not take any risk (for a given b = 0), e=β
b
 e = 0, the supervisor will choose e =
0 instead of e=1
b
. The problem of the owner is how to determine a, b to achieve the
maximization. The mathematical model of optimization is as follows:
max
a ,β,e
Ev=−a+(1−β)e
s. t{(IR)a+βe−12 ρβ2σ2−12 be2≥ω(IC)e=βb (10)
Taking constraint (IR) and incentive constraints (IC) into the objective function, then we
can obtain the following objective function: 
max
β ( βb−12 ρβ2σ2−b2 ( βb )
2
−ω) (11)
Get a first-order derivative: 
1
b
−ρβσ2−β
b
=0 (12)
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That is 
β= 1
1+bρσ2
>0 (13)
This solution means that the supervisor must take some risks, and b is a decreasing
function about r, s2 and b. 
From the perspective of incentive, when there is no information asymmetry, the greater
b is, the smaller e (the optimal e✳=1
b
) is. From the perspective of risk-sharing, the
greater b is, the bigger β( e=βb) is. The owner prefers a lower risk of cost savings. If the
level of effort can be observed when b = 0, the optimal effort level of e=1
b
; on the
other side, when b > 0, the supervisor can automatically select the optimal effort level: 
e=β
b
= 1
b(1+bρσ2)
<1
b (14)
Analysis: 
• The optimal level of effort under the asymmetric information strictly less than the level
of effort under the symmetric information. So when the owners can’t observe the
measured e, the supervisor will choose e < e* to improve their welfare. Because the
level of output not only relates to the level of effort with the supervisor, but also by the
impact of exogenous variables q. Attributed to adverse exogenous effects (such as
some non-objective control conditions, including the natural conditions), so the
supervisor can avoid accusations of the owners. This is the so-called "moral hazard"
problem. 
• The owner can’t observe the supervisor's effort level e, the supervisor should bear risk
than the symmetric information cases.
Conclusion: When the owner can observe the effort level e of the supervisor, both sides have
the symmetric information. Both Pareto optimal risk-sharing and Pareto optimal level of effort
can be achieved. The Pareto optimal contract: the supervisor doesn’t take any risk, and the
owner pay fixed income a✳=ω+ 1
2b
(the supervisor's retained income plus the cost of effort) to
the supervisor. Therefore, the optimal level of effort is e✳=1
b
.
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When the owner can’t observe the effort level e of the supervisor, that is, there is asymmetric
information. Both Pareto optimal and Pareto optimal risk-sharing can ‘t be achieved, then the
optimal contract is: to design a given incentive (b* > 0), the supervisor takes some risks,
whose optimal level of effort less than that under the symmetric information. The owner
selects the expected conducts through the selection and designed incentives to maximize their
expected income.
4. Project Case
4.1 Case One
The owner of a construction prepares to seek a supervision unit. There are three units have
the cooperation intention, and the owner can observe the effort level of the supervision unit.
The first supervision unit A requires the owner to pay the minimum wage RMB 2,000 to the
supervisors. The effort cost factor b is 0.0002. The second supervision unit B requires the
owner to pay the minimum wage RMB 2,300 to the supervisors. The effort cost factor b is
0.0003. The third supervision unit C requires the owner to pay the minimum wage RMB 2,500
to the supervisors. The effort cost factor b is 0.0005. According to the optimal linear contract
under the condition that the supervisor’s effort level e can be observed, the results are shown
in the table. From the calculated results in the Table 1, the owner should choose the third
supervisor unit C.
supervisor //RMB b //RMB //RMB //RMB
A 2,000 0.0002 5,000 4,500 500
B 2,300 0.0003 3,333.3 3,966.7 -633.4
C 2,500 0.0001 10,000 7,500 2,500
Table 1. The calculated results of game analysis between the owner and the supervisor
4.2 Case Two
One project owner intends to sign a principal-agent contract with a supervisor. The owner can’t
observe the supervisor’s effort level. The cost factor is b=0.0001; the absolute measure of risk
aversion r=0.1; the minimum wage is v=2,000; the exogenous uncertain variable
q~N(0.3002).
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According the formulas, we can get:
β = 1
1+b ρσ 2
=
1
1+0.0001x0.1x90,000
=0.526
e=β
b
= 0.526
0.0001
=5,263.158
a=ω +1
2
be2+1
2
ρ β 2σ 2−β e=2,000+1,385.042+1
2
x0.1x0.5262x90,000−0.526x5,263.158
=1,861.496
s (π )=a +β π=a+β (e+θ )=1,861.496+0.526 x5,263.158=4,630
At last, we can get the result: s (π )=4,630 RMB, that is, if the owner signs the above contract
with the supervisor, their profit will achieve balance at the same time.
5. The Impact of the Construction Supervision System
In the economic market, the rights and obligations among economic actors are expressed
through contracts. Once the contract relationship is established, it is difficult to observe the
conduct of the parties, which may result in moral hazard. The principal-agent model is the
basic framework to solve this problem. In the transaction process, the party with information
advantage is called the agent, while the other side is called the principal. The assumption
behind the definition is that the private information will affect the interests of the insiders
(Zheng, 2002). In the construction market, the relationship between the owner and the
supervisor is a typical principal-agent model.
5.1 The Basic Problem
The principal-agent relationship between the owner and the supervisor is the foundation of the
existence of the construction supervision system. The meaning of the construction supervision
is: the supervisor accepts the commission of the owner, and the supervisor should stands for
the owner to conduct the micro-supervision and management according to state-approved
construction, project construction documents, the construction of laws, regulations and
supervisory construction. From the meaning of the term, since the owner commissions the
supervisor, it would depend on the supervisor to implement the construction supervision and
management. The owner of the provisions implements their own rights and obligations within
the scope of supervision. The owner should not be beyond the supervision of the contract
rights. However, in the actual construction, the problem lies in the fact that the owner often
interferes with the supervising supervisor of the construction supervision and management.
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The destruction of the principal-agent relationship between the owners and the supervisor is
closely related to the potential moral hazard. In the actual construction market, because of the
absence of better incentive system, China's supervision is still in the early stages of
development. The credit of supervision industry is low, and some supervisors are of low
quality. Therefore, the owner often breaks the principal-agent relationship, in order to avoid
potential moral hazard. This destruction between the owner and the supervisor leads to a
direct consequence of more asymmetric information, intensifying the fraud of the construction
market, increasing the costs of society.
In the principal-agent relationship between owners and supervisors, there are two stages of
information asymmetry. As the owner has no knowledge of the ability of supervisors,
knowledge and reputation and other private information before signing the contract, owners
may lead to lower prices over the ability of supervisors out of a competitive market, so that
some low-level supervisors stay. Then the "adverse selection" arises. After signing the
contract, when the supervisors' behavior can’t be observed by owners, the information
asymmetry arises, and leads to "moral hazard". Through the above principal-agent game
analysis between owners and supervisors, we can see that under asymmetric information,
inhibition of "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" by the internal mechanism is designed to
achieve reasonable contract supervision. At the same time some external mechanism can
effectively inhibit the "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" to occur. China has adopted a
supervision system for more than ten years, and the supervision system in the healthy
development of reform and construction industry has played an important role. However, the
low commission fees, inadequate supervision and other issues are increasingly prominent,
which is a serious impact on the further deepening of supervision system. Through the
relationship of the principal-agent game analysis between owners and supervisors, we can
reduce the "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" by well-designed contract, while achieving
the interests of owners and supervisors to maximize the long-term interests, so as to achieve
"win-win" is a matter of concern.
We have studied optimal incentive contracts offered to a research and development (R&D)
manager, who can propose an innovative project and is in charge of conducting this project.
The solution to our optimal contracting model shows that incentives on the basis of the firm’s
market value are stronger for more profitable than for less profitable projects, and incentives
on the basis of efficiency objectives are stronger for less profitable than for more profitable
projects. The reason for the latter counter intuitive result is that strong incentives on the basis
of the firm’s market value place too much risk on the project manager, in particular, for
executing his routine job. These strong incentives are softened by reducing incentives for
efficiency objectives that directly affect the effort in the routine job.
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5.2 The Current Situation
The introduction of the construction supervision system effectively reduces the asymmetric
information in project construction. However, the degree of the asymmetric information is
related to the ability providing high-quality and high-tech services. After ten years of
development, the project management industry in China has made great progress in
significant quantities, but it varies greatly in quality. The qualified supervision is less than 10%.
The reasons for a lower level of supervision of the industry are various, such as the community
supervision system is not completely. It's also related to the supervision of industry and
personnel structure, training and personnel mechanisms. In our present supervision of
employees in the industry, vast majority of supervisors are from the construction, design
department. This part of the staff has a good supervisory; however, they are not proficient in
the economy, laws, regulations and policies for the economy market of today. Therefore,
developing a number of high-quality supervisory, supervision as soon as possible is urgency.
However, both the social and the current higher education don't have the training on the
supervision industry. Even if the supervisory unit doesn't have a long-term plan and a
complete incentive system, people don't realize that the lack of talent is the bottleneck to
restrict its development. And a supervision of the construction industry of low quality can't
meet the reduction of asymmetric information to the market requirements. As China enters the
WTO, the international market and domestic market opens, as a result, supervision is facing
severe challenges, which also brings opportunities. It is more essential to train a high-quality
supervision team.
6. The Solution of the Asymmetric Information
In summary, the supervision market in China has been improved to a certain extent, but there
are still some problems to solve. In face of the structure of the open market today, it is an
urgent matter for us to strengthen. It is a realistic problem to make the construction industry
in China occupying a place in the international market. The asymmetric information in the
construction industry is common. It is a question for each practitioner and theoretical study to
focus on, which includes how to regulate the behavior of participants and how to eliminate the
asymmetric information. It requires the building practitioners and the market managers to
understand the importance of the asymmetric information in-depth. The parties need to be
aware of the significance of the elimination of asymmetric information. As for the serious
trouble currently in the construction project management, the solutions should be proposed
timely. 
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6.1 For the Owner
• Strengthen the owners' monitoring mechanism. From the analysis of the boundary
function, we can see that the larger the penalties are, the greater the level of its
regulatory efforts is. So the owner can have a greater space of supervision. As a
consequence, it is better to promote the careful supervision of the commissioner of
party choice behavior. Therefore, in the actual operation of the construction, owners
should strengthen supervision and management, and establish a good transport
mechanism, effectively suppressing the third-party misconduct, to ensure the
successful completion of the project.
• Achieve project management are instead of supervision system. Employ professional
project Management Company to manage the entire project. Create new project
management model. Use the consecutive payments incentive mode in stage in the
project management, so that the agent can understand the existence of the incentive,
prompting them to work hard. There are many factors about the supervisor's
performance rewards. Firstly consider the quality of the supervisor, which decides the
ability level, the absolute risk aversion degree and the effort cost. The stronger of the
supervisor's ability is, the greater of the ability with risks is, and the more adventurous
of personality characteristics. The owner of the project chooses a supervisor which
should be suited to the characteristics of the project on quality as the premise of the
incentive mechanism playing its proper efficiency. Under the condition of asymmetric
information, the Pareto optimal linear contract can be achieved. Because of the owner is
a risk neutral party, the agent should be aware of the risk aversion, Pareto risk sharing
requests the supervisor not assuming any risk, and the owner don't need to make any
incentive agent. Under the condition of asymmetric information, the performance
reward that the supervisor gets should reflect the changes in the external environment
condition. The owner's performance reward is scheduled generally according to the
project performance, but the project performance not only completely depends on the
effort level, but also the result of the joint of the external environment factors. When
the risk increases, the owner should reduce the risk level. When the supervisor's risk
reduces, the owner should increase the affordable risk of the supervisor, to motivate the
agent's enthusiasm. Therefore, when making supervisor‘s performance rewards should
exclude more external factors as much as possible.
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6.2 For the Supervisor
• Strengthen the internal construction of the supervision and establish a scientific and
effective incentive system, such as the bonus incentives about the claimed loss and the
construction process associated with quality. Internal mechanism is through rational
design agent contract to develop an incentive mechanism, so that the supervisors'
target will close to the owners'. Taking this measure can alleviate supervisors to take
opportunistic behaviors and make the dynamic adverse selection, so that moral hazard
and adverse selection can be suppressed. But whether the internal mechanism can play
the expected role depends on owners' choice of supervisors, monitoring and evaluation
of right or wrong, that is, it depends on the correctness of the information obtained. If
owners are in order to provide high effectiveness of the operation of this mechanism, it
needs the appropriate measures and cost, so that they can get the information to
"select the appropriate project division "and" make the supervisor perform accurately".
Therefore, the internal machine system only can reduce the efficiency of the non-
agency relationship to a certain extent, but its validity is subject to the information
costs and the limitation of the imperfect information. Taking the appropriate incentives
to reduce the probability of moral hazard issue can reduce the illegal construction
practices. Owners can sign a contract with the construction side, to meet the quality
requirements of the premise in the case of early completion, giving a certain
percentage reward, which are not more than the additional revenue of the illegal
construction obtained. Thus, it not only can reduce the construction side's cheating
space, and improve the enthusiasm of the construction to choose the normal building,
also promoting the project to put into use in advance, as soon as possible to recover
the investment.
• To solve the "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" in asymmetric information
environment, reputation effects have a valid role. When the game only performs once
or a limited time (for supervisors only exist in the market for a short-term), supervisors
only care about each stage of the current income. However, if the game is infinitely
repeated (the supervisor on the market for a long term), any short-term opportunistic
behavior of the proceeds are negligible.
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6.3 For the Contractor
Show great strength to increase the punishment to illegal construction parties. Increasing the
punishment can enhance the supervisor to take the work seriously and make up the mistakes
that the asymmetric information has made. As a result, the risk of the moral hazard will be
decreased to a great extent. The solution of the game elements of the relationship between
variables and analysis increases the punishment, which can reduce cheating effectively. Many
construction sites that are in order to achieve maximum self-interest, with this solution, the
probability of the occurrence of moral hazard will be decreased. Although the punishment is
too large to some extent can contain illegal act of construction parties, but may also reduce
their construction initiative. The determination of punishment not only plays a limited role in
illegal construction of the construction sides. And the actual situation should be based on the
relationship between punishment and enthusiasm. 
6.4 For other Sides
• Strengthen our building laws and regulations and speed up the construction of the
standardization process of building market. Improve the existing supervision system,
and establish the self-regulatory mechanism of this industry, forming a fair market,
having honest ethics and values. Industry associations should make a series of
information disclosure, clear and workable agreement to improve the transparency of
information, to provide a platform for healthy and orderly for the supervisors.
Meanwhile, the supervisor should take reasonable incentives, improving the supervision
of supervision for serious acts of favorable space to a certain extent, increasing their
motivation and effectiveness.
• Strengthen the education of the perpetrator in the construction market. Ensure they are
aware of information asymmetry prevalent in the construction industry and the
construction supervision system in addressing the role of asymmetric information.
• External mechanism is the introduction of competition between supervisors. Sound and
effective competition in the market plays a self-restraint, self-monitoring role for
supervisors, and has a memory function to the accumulation of the results of their
actions. Reputation can be accurately reflected by the market. For reputation
considerations, supervisors will make a commitment, and always tend to choose to
maximize the effectiveness of the actions of owners, to get the market's trust in order
to better foothold in the market. 
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6.5 Brief Summary
The supervisor will have enthusiasm to build a good reputation to achieve greater benefits for
long term. It is urgent to establish a sound and effective and competitive supervision market in
China. When reputation is no longer a moral issue, but a system, the results will improve the
game balance. 
7. Conclusion
Through the above principal-agent game analysis between owners and supervisors, we can see
that under asymmetric information, inhibition of "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" by the
internal mechanism is designed to achieve reasonable contract supervision. At the same time
some external mechanism can effectively inhibit the "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" to
occur. Through two project cases, we validate the model successfully. The solution to our
optimal contracting model shows that incentives on the basis of the firm’s market value are
stronger for more profitable than for less profitable projects, and incentives on the basis of
efficiency objectives are stronger for less profitable than for more profitable projects.
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